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I.

INTRODUCTION

Environmental regulation of agriculture stands at a critical and controversial juncture. This juncture is not so much the result of changes in environmental requirements, as it is the result of a gradual and inevitable extension of
environmental regulation to previously unregulated areas of agriculture. The
relative immunity of nonpoint source pollution to mandatory regulation, for example, may be extinguished in proposed regulations for impaired waters and
concentrated animal feedlots. The regulatory threat, however, is tempered by
court decisions that are more inclined to place limits on the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") regulatory authority or to require compensation for
regulatory takings. If this tension between the regulators and the courts continue,
all that can be said with certainty is that the controversial regulation of impaired

•
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waters, wetlands, endangered species, concentrated animal feedlot operations,
and nonpoint source pollution will be lengthy, divisive, and subject to political
pressure.
IT. SUPREME COURT CASES
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 1 petitioner claimed the state's action, in
applying its wetlands regulation to prevent the development of wetlands on his
property, constituted a regulatory taking without just compensation, as required
by the Fifth Arnendment. 2 The Rhode Island Superior Courr and state Supreme
Court rejected the claim on several grounds. 4 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
found the petitioner's takings claim was not yet ripe, despite the state's actions in
denying two of petitioner's requests for a permit to develop his property.s The
court determined that doubt still remained as to whether the state would grant a
permit for a less extensive development of the land in question, and therefore the
state's action was not a final decision. 6 Moreover, the court held that petitioner
could not bring a regulatory takings claim based on a regulation that existed before petitioner acquired legal ownership of the property in question.' The court
additionally held that even if these impediments to petitioner's claim had not
existed, it would nevertheless have found that no taking had occurred. 8 The court
held that the petitioner could not establish that the economic value of his property
had been totally destroyed, under the total taking standard established in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Councif.9 The court reasoned that because the portion of
petitioner's property that was not covered by the regulation was still worth
$200,000, petitioner could also not succeed under the more general reasonable
investment backed standard set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York. 10 The court found the petitioner could not have any reasonable ex-

I.
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
2.
See id. at 611.
3.
See Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 86-1496, 1995 WL 941370
(R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Palazzolo].
4.
See Palazzolo v. State ex rei. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000) [hereinafter Tavares].
5.
See id. at 714.
6.
Seeid.
7.
Seeid. at715.
8.
See id. at 717.
9.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
10.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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pectations of profitable use, given the regulation preventing the development was
in place when the petitioner acquired the property.••
The Supreme Court disagreed with most of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's holdings} 2 The Court found the state's actions in denying petitioner's
permits did constitute of a fmal decision, despite the fact the petitioner had not
sought permits for projects involving a significantly smaller portion of his wetlands, due to the rationale given by the state for the refusal of the permits. 13 The
regulation in question did not permit any development of wetlands unless a
"compelling public purpose" was served, irrespective of the amount of wetlands
involved, and the state had already indicated in its denial of petitioner's permit
applications that the petitioner's purpose did not serve a compelling public interest.14 The Court found the state had decided there would be no permitting of ordinary development on wetlands, and therefore petitioner's claim was ripe without further applications or other state action. 15
The Court also found that a purchaser or successive titleholder is not
necessarily barred from pursuing a takings claim resulting from a regulation in
place before the acquisition of the property, even though the new titleholder was
on notice about the regulation. 16 The Court held that one of the purposes of the
Takings Clause was to enable citizens to compel compensation for state actions
that were manifestly unreasonable and onerous, and that manifestly unreasonable
actions did not become less unreasonable as time passed or ownership interests
changed. 17 The Court further pointed out that such a rule penalize new owners
for the failure of previous owners to protest possibly unreasonable state actions,
when the previous owners may have been unable or unwilling to take action. 18
Having dealt with these preliminary bars to petitioner's claim, the Court
proceeded to evaluate the substance of petitioner's claim. The Court agreed with
the Rhode Island Supreme Court that the petitioner did not have a claim for a
total taking, since petitioner had accepted the lower court's determination that the
remainder of petitioner's property was still worth $200,000, passing over petitioner's argument that the wetland and other portions of the property were dis-

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

See Tavares, 146 A.2d at 715-17.
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632.
See id. at 619.
See id. at 619-20.
See id. at 624-25.
See id. at 626.
See id. at 627.
Seeid.
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tinct segments due to the fact it was not raised at the lower levels. 19 However, the
Court remanded on the issue of whether the regulation and permit denials destroyed petitioner's reasonable investment backed expectations, because the
lower court based its rejection of this claim on its incorrect holding that petitioner
could have no claim and no reasonable expectations of profit when the regulation
was in existence before petitioner acquired the property. 20
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, 21 petitioner had sought a section 404 permit from the United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to fill wetlands for the purpose of
building a waste disposal site. 22 The wetlands in question had developed from
abandoned sand and gravel mining pits and were isolated, completely intrastate
wetlands, neither connected nor adjacent to any interstate waters. 23 However, it
was discovered that migratory birds frequented the wetlands. 24 Under section
404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the Corps has the authority to issue or
deny permits "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters''25 with "navigable waters" being further defmed as the "waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.' 026 The Corps had a regulation further defming that intrastate waters may be considered to be waters of the United States
when they are or could be used as habitat by either birds protected under Migratory Bird Treaties, other migratory birds that cross state lines, or endangered species, as well as when water from such bodies is used to irrigate interstate crops. 27
This Corps regulation was known as the Migratory Bird Rule. 28 Upon discovering the site was used as habitat by birds that migrated across state lines, the Corps
denied the permit on the basis of the Migratory Bird Rule. 29 This decision was
challenged by petitioner under the Administrative Procedure Act, on the alternative grounds that either the Corps had exceeded its statutory authority in applying

19.
Seeid.at630-31.
20.
See id. at 632.
21.
See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001), remanded to 2001 WL 31272 (7th Cir. 2001).
22.
See id. at 162-63.
23.
See id.
24.
See id. at 164.
25.
Id. at 163 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)).
26.
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)).
See id. at 164 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217).
27.
28.
See id. at 164 n.l (The Court noted that "[t]he Corps issued the 'Migratory Bird
Rule' without following the notice and conunent procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.§ 553").
29.
See id. at 165.
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the CWA to gain jurisdiction over these intrastate waters, or that Congress had
exceeded its Commerce Clause power to regulate such intrastate waters if activities on such waters, taken cumulatively, had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.30 Noting the substantial contributions activities relating to migratory
birds made to interstate commerce, the Court found that the cumulative impact
did in fact exist for such regulation. 31 The Court of Appeals found that Congress
intended for the Act to reach as many waters as possible, and therefore the
Corps' Migratory Bird Rule was a reasonable interpretation of its jurisdiction
under the Act. 32 However, upon review, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, fmding that the CWA did not authorize the Corps to have jurisdiction over
isolated, intrastate waters based on the Migratory Bird Rule. 33
The Court stated that although it had previously recognized in United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 34 that the word "navigable" was of
limited importance in determining Clean Water Act jurisdiction, it was not
prepared to completely negate the word's presence by failing to require any
significant nexus between waters to be regulated and actual navigable waters. 3s
The Court pointed out that Bayview Homes involved wetlands that were adjacent
to open, navigable waters, and as such, although not navigable in themselves,
were "inseparably bound up" with the waters of the United States, as opposed to
the wetlands in this case, which the Court found to be completely isolated and
not bound up with any water of the United States.36 The Court therefore held that
the CWA by its language did not extend to these waters.37
The Corps attempted to argue that, regardless of whether the CWA was
originally intended to cover such isolated, intrastate waters, Congress had acquiesced in such jurisdiction, as evidenced by the failure of legislation presented at
the time of the 1977 amendments to the CWA that explicitly attempted to limit
the Corps' expansive interpretation of its jurisdiction.38 However, the Court held
that congressional acquiescence to administrative interpretations is never to be
lightly assumed, and failed legislative bills alone are generally insufficient to
demonstrate such acquiescence, given the wide variety of reasons why a bill

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Seeid.
See id.
See id. at 166.
See id. at 174.
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County, 531 U.S. at 172.
See id. at 167-68.
Seeid.at171-72.
See id. at 168-69.
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might be proposed or faii.l 9 The Court did not find sufficient other legislative
history to reinforce the Corps' claim that the failed bill indicated acquiescence,
and therefore rejected this argument. 40
The Corps further argued, even if the statute and the legislative history
did not demonstrate that Congress intended to give the Corps jurisdiction over
non-navigable, intrastate waters, Congress at the very least failed to address the
issue one way or the other, and therefore the Court should give Chevron deference in this instance.41 The Court stated Chevron deference does not apply when
an agency's interpretation of a statute stretches the limits of Congress' power, as
this interpretation would stretch Congress' Commerce Clause power, lest the
Court needlessly fmd constitutional issues that Congress did not intend to casually create.42 The Court held that such an interpretation would only be accepted
when clear indications were present to demonstrate that Congress really did intend to utilize the utmost boundaries of its constitutional power. 43
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the United States District
Court after determining the United States Army Corps of Engineers exceeded
their authority under section 404(b) of the CWA. 44 The district court was instructed to decide whether the Migratory Bird Rule was the only proper basis for
the Corps' requirement of a permit or if alternate grounds of jurisdiction could be
utilized that would not be inconsistent with the opinion of the Court.45 The Court
held that if the district court found that the Corps' authority in this case relies on
the Migratory Bird Rule alone, the action must be dismissed. 46 If the district
court found other valid bases for jurisdiction, further proceedings would be conducted in accordance with the judgment ofthe Supreme Court.47
In response to the Court's ruling, the Corps changed its working defmition of "wetlands," removing the category for isolated, solely intrastate water
bodies.48 The Corps expected litigation in response to this change, but viewed
the change as a positive first step, and expected to issue further guidance in the

39.
See id. at 169-70.
40.
See id. at 170.
41.
See id. at 172.
42.
See id. at 172-74.
43.
See id. at 174.
44.
See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs, No. 982277,2001 WL 312372, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2001).
45.
See id.
46.
See id.
47.
See id.
48.
See Court Decision on Isolated Waters Prompts Army Corps to Revise Definition,
69 U.S.L.W. (BNA) No. 33, at 2561 (Mar. 20, 2001).
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form of policy guidance documents in response to the decision. 49 In addition, the
ruling was expected to increase the regulatory burden on states, as a large percentage of the nation's wetlands will no longer be covered by federal regulation.50 The new ruling would limit the scope of regulation to about twenty percent of the nation's wetlands, eliminating regulation for wet meadows, forested
wetlands, vernal pools, non-navigable streams and rivers, and large portions of
the Alaskan tundra. 51 Only fourteen states have regulations that would fill the
gap created under this ruling. 52 Authorities feared that many wetlands would go
unprotected and called for the development of new state programs. 53
On a sharply divided court, Judge Reinhardt of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that development moratoria cannot result in
compensable takings under First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles,54 even when they deprive owners of all economically beneficial
use of land for extended periods. 55 The United States Supreme Court granted cert
in the case, Tahoe-Sie"a Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,56 to determine if a moratorium constitutes a taking within the elusive
notion of a temporary taking. 57
The district court ruled that the agency's temporary moratorium had
worked a compensable temporary taking. 58 It stressed that the regulation "denied
the plaintiffs all economically viable use of their property."59 Furthermore, although the regulation ''was clearly intended to be temporary, since it was adopted
pending the enactment of a new regional plan, there was no fixed date for when it
would terminate.''60 In addition, the court expressed skepticism about whethe..r
development "moratoria remain[ed] legitimate planning tools after First Eng49.
See id.
50.
See State Regulatory Burden May Increase After Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision, 69 U.S.L. W. (BNA) No. 31, at 2491 (Feb. 20, 200 l ).
51.
See id.
52.
Seeid.
53.
See id. at 2492.
54.
See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 305 (1987).
55.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg') Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764,
777-78 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Tahoe-Sie"a Pres. Council II].
56.
Seeid.
57.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg') Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct.
1465 (2002) [hereinafter Tahoe-Sie"a Pres. Council Ill].
58.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp.
2d 1226, 1251 (D. Nev. 1999).
59.
/d. at 1249.
60.
/d. at 1250.
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/ish.' 761 Although some courts have upheld such moratoria, the district court considered these possibly consistent with the Supreme Court's allowance for normal
delays. 62 It distinguished moratoria like those in First English, which had no
expiration date, from the interim planning moratorium, which is enacted with a
deadline and usually extends for a short period.63 In the latter case, the government's culpability would be less. However, in the present case, "[e]nacting an
unconstitutional ordinance with no plans to end it is different than simply putting
a hold on development for a few months while trying to formulate a plan under
which development will be possible. ' 764
Judge Reinhardt's Ninth Circuit opinion attacked the district court's basic premise:
It is true that First English holds that, when a taking has occurred, the government
must compensate property owners, even if the taking is "temporary." Contrary to
the plaintiffs' suggestion, however, the Court's holding in First English was not that
temporary moratoria are "temporary takings." In fact, the opposite is true. The
First English Court very carefully defined "'temporary' regulatory takings [as]
those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the courts." (Citations
omitted) What is ''temporary," according to the Court's definition, is not the regulation; rather, what is ''temporary" is the taking, which is rendered temporary only
when an ordinance that effects a taking is struck down by a court. In other words, a
permanent regulation leads to a "temporary" taking when a court invalidates the ordinance after the taking. (Citations omitted) The Court's definition, therefore, does
not comprehend temporary moratoria, which from the outset are designed to last for
only a limited period of time. In short, we reject the plaintiffs' contentions that First
English applies to temporary moratoria and that it works a radical change to takings
law by requiring that property interests be carved up into finite temporal segments. 65

The Ninth Circuit opinion discussed at some length the court's rejection of "conceptual severance" of parcels, citing Professor Margaret Jane Radin for the
proposition that "[a] planning regulation that prevents the development of a parcel for a temporary period of time is conceptually no different than a land-use
restriction that permanently denies all use on a discrete portion of property, or
that permanently restricts a type of use across all of the parcel.' 766 Each of these
61.
/d. at 1249.
See id. (citing Santa Fe Viii. Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 914 F. Supp. 478, 483
62.
(D.N.M. 1995); Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195, 1206-07 (N.D. Cal. 1988)).
Seeid.
63.
64.
/d.
65.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council II, 216 F.3d at 778.
66.
/d. at 776 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross
Currents in the Jurisprudence ofTakings, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1674-78 (1988)).
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three types of regulation will have an impact on the parcel's value, because each
will affect an aspect of the owner's use of the property-by restricting when the
use may occur, where the use may occur, or how the use may occur. However,
Judge Reinhardt's Ninth Circuit opinion did concede that
were a temporary moratorium designed to be in force so long as to eliminate all present value of a property's future use, we might be compelled to conclude that a
categorical taking had occurred. We doubt, however, that a true temporary moratorium would ever be designed to last for so long a period.67

The Ninth Circuit denied en bane review, 68 over strong dissent by Judge
Kozinski. 69 He asserted that the panel decision written by Judge Reinhardt "does
not like the Supreme Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence very much, so it reverses First English, and adopts Justice Stevens's First English dissent."70
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, affirmed the decision of the
Ninth Circuit.71 The Court held that a moratorium does not constitute a per se
taking and that the question of whether the takings clause requires the government to pay compensation for enacting a temporary regulation that denies property owners all viable economic use of their property is not decided by any categorical rule, but rather by applying the factors of Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City. 12
Ill. DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass 'n v. United States Fish and Wildlife
Service73 involved the United States Department of Fish and Wildlife Services'
critical habitat designation of a species listed as endangered, the Southwestern
Willow Flycatcher. 74 The Endangered Species Act ("ESA") requires the Fish and

67.
Id. at 781.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998
68.
(9th Cir. 2000) (denying rehearing en bane).
69.
See id. at 999 (Kozinski, J., dissenting, joined by O'Scannlain, Trott, T.G. Nelson,
and Kleinfeld, JJ.).
70.
Id. (citing First English, 482 U.S. 304); see also Steven J. Eagle, Just Compensation
for Permanent Takings ofTemporal Interests, 4 Fed. Cir. B. J. 485,487 (2001).
71.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Ill, 122 S. Ct. at 1465.
See id.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104.
72.
73.
See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277
(lOth Cir. 2001).
74.
See id. at 1279.
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Wildlife Services to make an economic analysis of the impact of any critical
habitat designation before. fmalizing it. 75 In making its economic analyses, Fish
and Wildlife Services had adopted an "incremental baseline approach" to the
economic effects, whereby economic effects that flow from the listing of the species, rather than the selection of a particular habitat designation, were below the
"baseline" and not to be considered in the determination of economic impact.16
Using the baseline method, Fish and Wildlife Services determined that the critical habitat designation had resulted in no economic effects beyond those that
were caused by the listing of the species. 77 Petitioners challenged the designation
under the Administrative Procedure Act, primarily on the basis that the baseline
approach violated the ESA, claiming that the ESA requires that all economic
effect be considered when making a critical habitat designation. 78 The district
court upheld the Fish and Wildlife Services methodology/9 but the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed. 80
The court began its analysis by stating that the district court erred in giving Chevron deference to Fish and Wildlife Services' interpretation of the ESA,
because this interpretation had never undergone the rule-making process. 81 The
court proceeded to give the proper standard, whether the agency's interpretation
was "well-reasoned" and had the "power to persuade."82 The court then decided
that since the baseline approach renders the economic analysis required by Congress virtually meaningless, the baseline approach had to be in violation of the
language and intent of the argument that including economic impacts that are
caused, or at least co-extensively caused, by the listing itself, rather than the designation, would cause economic concerns to become a factor in the listing process, something that is forbidden by the ESA.83 The court found that the consideration of economic factors at a point subsequent to listing could not have an
effect on the process of the prior listing, nor diminish the protections offered by
the listing, but rather would result in such economic factors influencing the deci-

75.
See id. at 1280 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (b)(2)).
See id.
76.
77.
See id.
78.
See id.
79.
See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 81 F. Supp.
2d 1141, 1162 (D.N.M. 1999).
80.
See id., rev'd, New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277 (lOth Cir. 2001).
81.
See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass 'n., 248 F.3d at 1281.
See id. (quoting Fristoe v. Thompson, 144 F.3d 627,631 (lOth Cir. 1998)).
82.
See id. at 1284-85.
83.
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sion of which areas should be designated as critical habitat, which was in fact
what Congress had intended. 84
Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage District v. United StatesB 5 involved
contractual water use rights and when regulatory interference with those rights
may constitute a taking. 86 In this area, the water supply is primarily managed by
the Central Valley Project, run by the Federal Bureau of Reclamation, and the
State Water Project, run by the Department of Water Resources, projects which
share a coordinated pumping system and must therefore be run in concert with
each other. 87 Both projects are granted water permits by the State Water Resources Control Board to withdraw or use certain amounts of water from the
Feather and Sacramento Rivers. 88 The projects in turn had contracted with certain of the plaintiffs in this matter, giving the plaintiffs the right to withdraw or
use a certain amount ofthe water, and those plaintiffs had by contract given those
rights to certain other plaintiffs for irrigation and other purposes.89
In 1992, the National Marine Fisheries Service discovered that the operation of the projects was likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Chinook salmon population, in violation of the ESA.90 This situation was further
complicated by the discovery, the following year, that the projects would also
jeopardize the continued existence of the delta smelt. 91 The agency determined
that the "reasonable and prudent alternative" that would prevent the federal activity from jeopardizing the species' existence, as required by the ESA, would involve restrictions on the time and manner in which the water was purnped.92
These restrictions resulted in plaintiffs being deprived of the water for which they
had contracted.93 The plaintiffs proceeded to bring a takings claim under the
Fifth Amendment, claiming that they were being forced to bear the entire cost, in
terms of water, of a public burden. 94 Plaintiffs argued that this was essentially
equivalent to a physical taking of the water property right, since the government's action completely destroyed the water property's economic uses, as per

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id. at 1285.
Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
See id.
Seeid.at314.
See id. at 315.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 316.
See id.
See id.
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the Lucas95 standard.96 The defendant countered with three arguments: that the
restrictions on water merely resulted in the frustration of the water contracts'
purpose, and were therefore not a taking under Omnia Commercial Co. v. United
States; 97 that there were no reasonable investment backed expectations nor a substantial decrease in value as would be required by the standard for use interference takings, as set forth by Penn Central; 98 and the federal government cannot
be liable for a taking when it merely imposes a limitation that state law would
otherwise require.99 Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the court
granted plaintiff's motion. 100
The court began by distinguishing the facts of this case from the situation
in Omnia Commercial Company v. United States. 101 Contrary to the defendant's
claims, the court found in this case, the ownership of the right to use specified
quantities of water had already been transferred to the plaintiffs, whose property
interests in the water and its use were thereby superior to all others, and therefore
not subject to Omnia. 102
The court proceeded to evaluate the nature of the taking in this instance,
and decided the government's action was, as plaintiffs argued, such a deprivation
of and interference with plaintiffs' property that it was as complete as a physical
taking, and therefore automatically required compensation, 103 according to Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 104 The court rejected defendant's argument
that this case should be analyzed as a potential regulatory, substantial use interference taking under Penn Central, pointing out that although the regulation in
question might merely be the typical regulatory restriction on use, in the area of
water rights, the entire property right consists of the right to use the water, and to

95.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
96.
See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 318.
See Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502,508-11 (1923).
97.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104.
98.
99.
See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 317-20.
See id. at 314, 324.
100.
101.
Omnia, 261 U.S. at 502. In Omina the Plaintiff had contracted for the right to purchase steel plate at a below market price, but was subsequently unable to do so, because the United
States requisitioned all of the Defendant's steel plate. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment only applied to an actual appropriation of a property, not any of the side effects of the
appropriation, and that although the actual owner of the steel would have been due just compensation, the government had no obligation to compensate an individual who merely had a contractual
expectation of receiving the property. See id.
102.
See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 317-18.
103.
See id. at 318.
104.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
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restrict use is to restrict the whole right. 105 The court further supported its position by pointing to previous case law indicating that a seizure of water rights is to
be treated as a physical taking, wherever the diversion or withdrawal of the water
occurred. 106
As a fmal matter, the court dealt with the defendant's claim that either
the language of the contracts or other requirements of state law limited the plaintiffs' titles in their water property rights. 107 The court agreed that the contract
language specified that the Department of Water Resources, the state permitting
agency, could not be held liable for water shortages beyond their control, which
would presumably include shortages imposed by the federal govemment. 108
However, the court pointed out, the fact that the state agency was contractually
immune from such liability merely provided a breach of contract defense, rather
than turning the nature of the plaintiffs' water rights into a contingent interest. 109
Moreover, the provision did not provide the federal government with immunity.110 Similarly, the court agreed that if plaintiffs' water use was unreasonable
or violative of the public trust, then plaintiffs could have no vested interest in the
water under California law, but disagreed with defendant's argument that the
plaintiffs' use was unreasonable because it would interfere with the salmon and
the delta smelt. 111 Instead, the court agreed with the plaintiffs' argument that the
state's formal allocation of water rights reflected the state's view of the water's
reasonable use, and absent a reallocation of the state's water by the state, which
did not happen here, the state had recognized as reasonable the Department of
Water Resources' right to contract out the use of the water which it was allocated.112
In Kandra v. United States, 113 plaintiffs, in the process of challenging the
United States Bureau of Reclamations Annual Operating Plan for the Klamath
Reclamation Project, sought to obtain a preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the plan. 114 To keep from jeopardizing the endangered Lost
River and Shortnose Sucker fish, a main staple of the Klamath and Yurok Tribes,
105.
See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 318-20.
106.
See id. at 319 (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); see also United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931)).
107.
See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 320-21.
108.
See id. at 321.
109.
See id.
110.
See id.
Ill.
See id. at 321-22.
112.
See id. at 322-23.
113:
See Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001).
114.
See id. at 1192.
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who hold fishing and water treaty rights in the Klamath River Basin, and the
threatened coho salmon, the Bureau of Reclamations determined to maintain
water elevations of the Upper Klamath Lake and water flows below the Iron Gate
Dam at a certain level. liS However, the maintenance of those water levels would
result in no irrigation water deliveries to the majority of land within the Klamath
Reclamation Project, since insufficient water would be present to support both
uses! 16
The court began by stating the standard for a preliminary injunction: a
party "must show either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and
the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) that serious questions are raised and
the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." 117 The court first sought to
determine whether the hardships would fall much more heavily upon the plaintiff
in this case. 118 The court recognized that the plaintiffs would suffer severe hardship to both their economic interests and their way of life if the Bureau of Reclamations deprived the plaintiffs of irrigation water. 119 On the other hand, the
court found this hardship was balanced by several other hardships that would
occur if the plan was not implemented. 120 These hardships included jeopardy to
the continuing existence of endangered species, a possible hardship that was
given the highest priority by Congress in the Endangered Species Act, harm to
the livelihood and tribal customs of the Klamath and Yurok Tribes, and economic harm and deprivation of a way of life for other fishing communities. 121 In
balancing these interests, the court was unable to find that the balance of hardship
was more heavily weighted on one side than the other. 122
The court then proceeded to evaluate the likelihood of the success of the
plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs alleged two breach of contract claims: that the Bureau of Reclamation breached its contract "by using Project water for purposes
other than irrigation," and that the Bureau of Reclamation breached its contract
with plaintiffs by failing to ensure that the water supply remained sufficient to
meet the contract obligations. 123 The court found the plaintiffs' contract rights to
irrigation water were subservient to the Endangered Species Act and tribal trust
115.
See id. at 1195-98.
116.
See id. at 1199.
117.
/d. (citing Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839-40
(9th Cir. 2001)).
118.
See id. at 1200.
119.
See id. at 1200-01.
120.
See id. at 120 1.
121.
See id.
122.
See id.
123.
See id.

2002]

Developments Concerning Environmental Law and Agriculture

355

requirements, thereby rejecting plaintiffs flrst breach of contract claim. 124 The
court also rejected the plaintiffs' second breach of contract argument, stating that
the plaintiffs had provided little evidence that the Bureau of Reclamation could
have preserved the water by asserting claims against junior users. 125 Moreover,
the Bureau of Reclamation would have been prevented from doing so while
"[w ]ater rights adjudication for the Klamath River Basin to perfect asserted water
rights ... " was pending in the state courts. 126
Plaintiffs also claimed the Bureau of Reclamation violated both the National Environmental Policy Act (''NEPA"), by failing to make an Environmental
Impact Statement regarding the effects implementation of the plan would have,
and the ESA in a variety of ways. 127 Neither NEPA nor the ESA provide a private cause of action, so the plaintiffs' claims had to be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), and would succeed only if the plaintiffs could
show the Bureau of Reclamation's acts were arbitrary and capricious. 128 The
court did not flnd sufficient evidence to show that the agency's actions had been
arbitrary and capricious. 129 It further pointed out that even if the actions were
arbitrary and capricious, the APA can only force an agency to set aside a decision, not to compel an action. 130 This means that even if the agency were to succeed in forcing the Bureau of Reclamation to set aside its plan, they could not
force it to continue to release water for irrigation, as the preliminary injunction
would require. 131
On July 10, 2000, the National Marine Fisheries Service published the
fmal section 4(d) rule of the ESA, delegating power to manage species protection
and recovery to state and local levels. 132 This revolutionary approach allows
secretaries to "extend all endangered species protections to threatened species." 133
124.
See id.
125.
See id.
126.
Id. (several pre-1909 water rights claims to the Upper Klamath Lake had been filed
in state court).
See id. at 1202.
127.
See id.
128.
129.
See generally id. at 1202-05 (discussing the requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Reclamation Bureau's failure to fulfill the requirements).
See id. at 1205.
130.
See id.
131.
132.
See Endangered and Threatened Species; Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422, 42,47642,480 (July 10, 2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223).
See Valerie Ann Lee & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, Breathing New Life Into the ESA: The
133.
Pacific Northwest's Endangered Species Act Experiment in Devolution, 31 Envtl. L. Rev. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,102, 10,103 (Jan. 2001).
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Section 4(d) requires each secretary to issue "such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation" of threatened species. 134
The Department of Commerce issued a final rule under section 4(d) of
the ESA, in reference to fourteen species of salmon and steelheads.m A few
months later a group of Pacific Northwest irrigators filed a petition "to remove
seven populations of Columbia basin salmon and steelhead from the 'endangered' or 'threatened' lists." 136 Many more petitions seem likely as a result of a
district court opinion that the National Marine Fisheries Service erred when listing only wild and not hatchery-reared Oregon coastal coho salmon because the
ESA does not allow part of a population of fish to be listed. 137
IV. PESTICIDES AND HERBICIDES
In No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 138 an environmental

group attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction against the City of New York
under a provision of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA") to prevent the city from restarting its insecticide spraying over the city. 139 To obtain a
preliminary injunction, a party must show either a likelihood of success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or that serious questions are raised
and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. 140 However, when the
plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction against a "government action taken in the
public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, the injunction should
be granted only if the moving party meets the more rigorous likelihood-ofsuccess standard." 141 To have any likelihood of succeeding in its claim, the plaintiff had to show under RCRA that the defendant had "discarded" the insecticides. 142 The court stated a product is not discarded until after it has been used
for its intended purpose. 143 With respect to the insecticides being sprayed into the
134.
16 u.s.c. § 1533(d) (1994).
135.
See Endangered and Threatened Species; Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. at 42,422-42,481.
136.
First Salmon Delisting Petition Filed in Northwest as Result of Court Ruling, 32
Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1928 (Oct. 5, 2001).
137.
See Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1154-64 (D. Or. 2001).
138.
No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 252 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001).
139.
See id. at 149.
140.
See id. at 150 (citing Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 175 F.3d 266,
270 (2d Cir. 1999)).
141.
Jd. (quoting Beal v. Stem, 184 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1999)).
142.
See id.
143.
See id.
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air by the defendant, their intended purpose was to kill mosquitoes and the mosquitoes' larvae, so a suit under the RCRA would be unlikely to succeed in those
or similar circumstances. 1•44
In American Farm Bureau v. United States Environmental Protection
145
Agency, twenty-five organizations challenged the EPA's implementation of the
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996,1 46 which amends both the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act {"FFDCA") 147 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). 148 The FFDCA permits private actions against the
EPA if it fails to comply with the statutory schedule for reassessing the maximum allowable level of pesticide residue in food that is permissible under the
FFDCA. 149 Defendant EPA moved to dismiss the complaint based on failure of
the counts to meet AP A requirements, plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, claims not ripe, claims lacking in standing, and lack of jurisdiction. 150
Reviewing the two-prong test subsequent to TRAC/ 51 and discussing case law
subsequent to TRAC, 152 the court held that because TRAC analysis of the FFDCA
144.
See id. (holding that city's spraying of insecticide did not violate RCRA).
145.
See Am Farm Bureau v. E.P.A., 121 F. Supp. 2d. 84 (D.O. C. 2000).
146.
See Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489
(1996).
147.
See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (2000).
See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide on Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
148.
(2000).
See Am. Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 96 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 346(q)(3)).
149.
150.
See id. at 90.
151.
See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 77-79 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (holding that a petition seeking a writ of mandamus to force the FCC to act was subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals because 28 U.S. C. § 2342(1) (1982) & 47
U.S.C. § 402(a) (1982) authorized exclusive jurisdiction to review final FCC action). The court
reasoned that the Court of Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to make decisions that could affect
the circuit court's future jurisdiction, and that the district court Jacked concurrent jurisdiction based
on the principle that when Congress explicitly vests jurisdiction with one court, it cuts off original
jurisdiction in other courts. See id. at 76-77. The two prong test developed after TRAG asks: "(I}
does the statute commit review of agency action to the court of appeals and (2) does the action seek
relief that might affect the circuit court's jurisdiction?" Am. Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 91
(citing Jamison v. FTC, 628 F. Supp. 1548, 1550 (D.D.C. 1986)).
152.
See Am. Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 91-92; Cal. v. Riley, 750 F. Supp. 433
(E.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that limited appellate review provisions of the FFDCA did not divest the
district court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to EPA action under statutory or
constitutional claims according to 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Nader v. E.P.A., 859 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that because FFDCA § 346(a) and § 348 only allowed appellate review of orders issued
under sections not implicated in the case at hand, EPA's rejection of petition to revoke pesticide
tolerance was not appealable to the court of appeals); Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (holding that the appellate review provision § 355(h) of FFDCA applied only to cases chal-
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was not comparable to TRAC analysis of statutes that provide for broader appellate review, TRAC did not apply to the plaintiffs claims, and jurisdiction was
proper.m
Defendants argued that certain counts should be dismissed as the plaintiffs lacked standing. tS4 Defendants asserted that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
first two elements of constitutional standing as defined in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.m Plaintiffs claimed procedural, informational, and economic injury
because of the EPA's failures. 1S6 The court agreed with the defendants' argument
that the EPA is not required by statute to produce the information sought by the
plaintiffs, and therefore the plaintiffs could not base their standing upon informational or procedural injury.IS7 The court further found the plaintiffs' procedural
injury failed because they did not identify a legally protected interest infringed
upon by the EPA's procedural shortcomings. 158 The court held the plaintiffs'
claims of informational and economic standing also failed to meet the first two
requirements as set out by Lujan. 159
Defendants' asserted additional counts of the complaint warranted dismissal based on the failure of the counts to meet APA requirements, the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and ripeness. 160 Defendants asserted the plaintiffs failed to challenge an individual, concrete action of the EPA.
and instead attacked the general policy provisions of the EPA regarding pesticide
tolerances and registrations. 161 The court reasoned general policy programmatic
attacks were explicitly refused in Lujan, and therefore dismissed four of plain-

lenging disapproval of new drug regulations, not actual challenges to FDA regulations of new
drugs); Jamison, 628 F. Supp. 1548 (holding that TRAG allowed for an injunction where the statute
committed review of FTC action to the appellate court and future review was likely regardless of
constitutional claims).
See Am. Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
153.
154.
See id.
155.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 ( 1992) (to establish the
constitutional minimum of standing, plaintiffs much show: (l) plaintiff has suffered injury which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not hypothetical or conjectural, (2) a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct that is traceable to defendant, and (3) it is
likely the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision).
156.
See Am. Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 95-96.
See id. at 96.
157.
158.
See id.
159.
See id. at 97.
160.
See id. at 101.
161.
See id.
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tiffs' claims} 62 However, taking judicial review of the EPA's entries in the Federal Register regarding comments on policy, the court found that those notices
alone were not enough to merit granting the defendant's motion on the basis of
APA requirements.' 63 The court additionally denied the defendant's exhaustion
claim under similar reasoning. 164
The EPA announced a notice of availability, and was seeking public
comments on a draft Pesticide Registration Notice ("PR-Notice") entitled "Spray
and Dust Drift Label Statements for Pesticide Products." 165 This PR-Notice was
intended to provide guidance to pesticide registrants and other interested persons
on drift label statements for pesticide products. 166 The goal of this PR-Notice was
to improve the consistency of product label statements for controlling pesticide
drift from dust and spray applications, so that human health and the environment
might be better protected. 167 The comment period on this PR-Notice was initially
scheduled to close on November 20, 2001,1 68 but was extended until March 31,
2002 after the Agency received several requests to do so. 169

V. CLEAN WATER ACT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

In American Wildlands v. Carol Browner, 110 appellant challenged the
EPA's approval of some of Montana's water quality standards under the Clean
Water Act. Under the CWA, states are required to develop water quality standards for waters within their boundaries. 171 In promulgating these standards,
states must give each body of water a "designated use," determine and set forth
the degree to which various pollutants may be present in the water body without
harming the designated use, and provide an "antidegradation review policy" to

See id. at 103-04.
See id. at 106.
164.
See id.
165.
See Pesticides; Draft Guidance for Pesticide Registrants on New Labeling Statements for Spray and Dust Drift Mitigation, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,141,44,141 (Aug. 22, 2001).
166.
See Pesticides; Draft Guidance for Pesticide Registrants on New Labeling Statements for Spray and Dust Drift Mitigation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 44,141.
See Pesticides; Draft Guidance for Pesticide Registrants on New Labeling State167.
ments for Spray and Dust Drift Mitigation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 44,141.
See Pesticides; Draft Guidance for Pesticide Registrants on New Labeling State168.
ments for Spray and Dust Drift Mitigation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 44,141.
See Draft Guidance for Pesticide Registrants on New Labeling Statements for Spray
169.
and Dust Drift Mitigation; Extension of Comment Period, 67 Fed. Reg. 3192,3192 (Jan. 23, 2002).
170.
Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192 (I Oth Cir. 2001 ).
Seeid. at 1194(citing33 U.S.C. § 13l3(d)).
171.
162.
163.
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allow the states to evaluate any activities that might tend to further degrade water
quality. 172 The antidegradation review policy must be consistent with the threetier federal anti-degradation policy. 173 Furthermore, the states must identify any
body of water that does not meet its standard and set forth a "total maximum
daily load" (''TMDL") establishing the maximum amount of various pollutants
that can enter the water body from all sources combined. 174 However, EPA regulations permit states to allow water quality requirements to be exceeded in certain
areas where pollutant discharge initially meets a water body, so-called "mixing
areas," so long as certain criteria are still met. 175 After developing its standards,
each state must submit those standards to the EPA for approval. 176 If the EPA
disapproves of the standards, it must notify the state of any necessary changes,
and if those standards are not made, the EPA is required to impose appropriate
standards on the state. 177
Appellants challenged the EPA's approval of Montana's antidegradation
and mixing zone policies. 178 Montana's standards had exempted existing nonpoint sources from Tier II antidegradation review, and had further exempted subsequent nonpoint sources from such sources when reasonable conservation practices were used and beneficial uses were protected. 179 Montana also exempted
mixing zones from its antidegradation review policy, so long as the degradation
to the water body at the periphery of the mixing zone was not significant, although Montana did develop a number of other strict requirements regarding
mixing areas. 180 The district court found that the EPA's approval of these standards was proper, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 181
The court first determined that Congress had delegated its authority to
the EPA to apply and interpret the CWA, both in general and in this specific instance, and its interpretation was therefore entitled to Chevron deference and
would not be overturned unless the agency's decision was arbitrary and capri-

172.
See id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)); 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.3, 130.10(d)(4), 131.6,
131.10, l3l.l1 ).
173.
See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131.12).
174.
See id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)).
175.
See id. at 1195 (citing EPA, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK§ 5.l.l, at 5-5
(2d ed. 1994)).
See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131.13).
176.
177.
See id. at 1194 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c)(3)-13l3(c)(4)(A)).
See id. at 1196.
178.
179.
See id. at 1195 (citing MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 75-5-317(2)(a)-75-5-317(b)).
180.
See id. (citing MONT. ADMIN. R. §§ 17.30.715(1)(c), 17.30.505(1)(b),
17.30.505(1)(c), 17.30.506(1) (2001 )).
181.
See Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Colo. 2000).
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cious. 182 The court then determined that since the CWA does not give the EPA
the authority to regulate nonpoint source pollution, but instead merely requires
states to address the issue through their standards and so forth, the EPA was reasonable in interpreting that it could not disapprove an antidegradation policy on
the sole basis of how that policy addressed the issue of nonpoint source pollution.183 The court then turned to the EPA's argument that antidegradation review
requirements apply to a water body as a whole, rather than to a segment such as a
mixing zone. 184 The court found this interpretation was reasonable, especially
given the practical reality beneath mixing zones, and found the EPA was not arbitrary and capricious in approving Montana's exemption of mixing zones form
antidegradation review so long as review of the water around such zones indicates that the overall water quality is not being damaged. 185
In Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist. 186 , plaintiff alleged defendant's application of a pesticide into its man-made canals without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit was a violation of the CWA. 187 The
district court held the canals were waters of the United States under the CWA,
and the pesticide was a pollutant. 188 However, the district court concluded no
permit was needed for application because the EPA-approved label on the herbicide, approved under FIFRA, did not require the user to acquire a permit. 189 The
Ninth Circuit reversed. 190
The court began by stating that it is the duty of the courts to interpret
statutes so that they may coexist, if possible. 191 The court noted FIFRA and the
CWA serve different purposes, the purpose of comprehensive uniformly safe
labeling and the purpose of preserving the quality of water. 192 An approved label
establishes general conditions for a pesticides use, while permits for the discharge of pesticides requires consideration of specific, case-by-case environ-

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See Am. Wildlands, 260 F.3d at 1197.
See id. at 1198.
See id.
Seeid.
See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
See id.
See id. at 532-34.
See id. at 534.
See id.
See id. at 530-31.
See id. at 531.
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mental considerations. 193 Therefore, the court held a label's failure to specify that
a permit is required does not mean the CWA does not apply. 194
The court then proceeded to determine whether the district court was correct in determining the canals to be navigable waters, or waters of the United
States, in light of the recent Supreme Court holding in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County, which stated the definition of navigable waters did not
include isolated, intrastate bodies. 195 The court held that the canals still remained
within the category of navigable waters, despite the fact that the canals could be
and were isolated by the act of the defendant at certain times, because in general,
the canal received water from and dispensed water into natural bodies of waters
that were tributaries of navigable waters, and therefore they were not isolated. 196
In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 197 plaintiff ranchers who owned the
surface rights to a property sued the oil and gas properties operator on the ranch
for the discharge of oil and produced brine into ''navigable waters" under the Oil
Pollution Act, which defmes navigable waters as waters of the United States. 198
The waters in question were a seasonal creek on the ranch as well as the ground
water under the ranch. 199 Plaintiff claimed that these waters were covered, as
Congress wished to extend the jurisdiction of the Act to the extent of the Commerce Clause.200 Defendant argued that neither of these waters constituted navigable waters, and the district court agreed and awarded the defendant summary
judgment. 201 The Fifth Circuit affrrmed the summary judgment. 202
The court began by stating that although there was little case law elucidating the extent to which bodies of water are included in the Oil Pollution Act's
navigable waters jurisdiction, the Oil Pollution Act's definition of navigable waters wasintended by Congress to be identical with the CWA's defmition of navigable waters; a definition that has been frequently analyzed in courts. 203 The
court proceeded to state that although the Supreme Court has held that the
CWA's definition of navigable waters is not limited to waters that actually are

193.
194.
195.
159 (2001).
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id.
See id. at 532.
See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng'r, 531 U.S.
See Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 533-34.
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 265-67.
See id. at 265.
See id. at 267-68.
See id. at 267-72.
See id. at 265.
See id. at 267-68.
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navigable in the traditional sense/04 the broadness of the definition had recently
been limited by the Court's holding in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County. 205 The Court refused to hold Congress had intended to stretch the limits
of its Commerce Clause power in establishing the jurisdiction of the CWA, and
appeared to limit jurisdiction to bodies of water that are actually navigable, are
adjacent to an open body of navigable water, or are otherwise significantly linked
to an open body of navigable water. 206 The court held there was insufficient evidence presented for a reasonable trier of fact to find the seasonal creek at issue in
this case was either navigable or had any significant connection with an open
body of navigable water. 207 The court proceeded to state that Clean Water Act
case law was clear that groundwater itself was not navigable water under the
CW A. 208 Therefore, it would be inappropriate to allow a claim based on the discharge of a contaminant into groundwater merely because the contaminant somehow reached navigable water, since the Act's jurisdiction was limited to discharges that were actually made into the navigable water itself. 209
In a related proceeding, defendant insurers of Harken Exploration Company appealed the order of the United States District Court, which held insurers
had a duty to defend Harken in underlying lawsuits. 210 Defendants additionally
appealed the district court's award of the plaintiffs' defense costs for the underlying suits and the use of a ten percent interest rate to calculate prejudgment interest.211 The district court's rulings were affirmed. 212 Harken asked appellants to
defend it in the federal lawsuit filed by the Rices. 213 Harken carried two separate
insurance policies, one issued by each appellant. 214 Appellants denied Harken's
request and refused to defend it in the federallawsuit. 215 When the Rices' lawsuit
was dismissed from federal court and re-filed in state court, Harken again in-

204.
See id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985)
(upholding regulations that CWA restricts discharges into non-navigable "wetlands" adjacent to an
open body of navigable water)).
205.
See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County, 531 U.S. at 159.
206.
See Rice, 250 F.3d at 269-70.
See id. at 270-71.
207.
208.
See id.
209.
See id. at 272.
210.
See Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins., 261 F.3d 466,470 (5th Cir. 2001).
211.
See id.
212.
See id. at 478.
See id. at 470.
213.
214.
See id.
215.
See id.
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formed defendants of the suit and requested defense. 216 Appellants refused. 217
Appellants appealed the Dallas Court's grant of partial summary judgment in
favor of Harken, contending they did not owe Harken a duty to defend because
there was not an occurrence, as defmed by the policies, that under the policies
they were only obligated to indemnify, not defend Harken, and the alleged property damage did not occur during the policies' coverage periods. 218
The court found the companies had a duty to defend Harken, stating "the
general rule is that the insurer is obligated to defend if there is, potentially, a case
under the complaint within the coverage of the policy."219 The Rices alleged an
occurrence, or accident, against Harken in claiming that the rupture, leak or overflow of pollutants contaminated the Ranch's water and damaged the ranch generally.220 The Rices claimed Harken was negligent in its pollution of the ranch and
acted maliciously with awareness that its actions would cause property damage. 221
The court disagreed with Appellants' contention that the contaminated water and
damage to the ranch were not unexpected as they were the natural consequences
of operating an oil facility. 222 The court found merit with both parties' arguments
regarding the applicability of the policies to indemnify or defend Harken for
damage caused by pollutants.223 The court stated that since multiple interpretations of the policy were reasonable, the policy must be construed against the insurer.224 Considering the Rices' allegations of fifty-three occurrences of polluting, both before and after notice was given to Harken, the court found that the
damage did occur during the coverage periods of the policies.225 The court additionally held that Harken's defense costs were reasonable and properly awarded,
and that the Dallas Court's use of a ten percent interest rate was not in error since
the parties had not unambiguously and expressly established the amount owed
under a contract, as per section 302.003 of the Texas Financial Code Annotated.226

216.
See id.
217.
See id.
218.
Seeid. at471.
Jd.
219.
220.
See id. at 473.
See id.
221.
222.
See id. at 474.
See id. at 475.
223.
See id. (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Green Tree Corp., 249 F.3d 389, 392
224.
(5th Cir. 2001)).
See id. at476-77.
225.
Seeid.at411-18.
226.
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In Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven,227 plaintiff sued defendant on the basis
of its past actions as an operator of a landfill and culverts serving the landfill.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant both violated the RCRA (as a past owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility,. who had contributed or who
was contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment), and the Clean Water
Act (by discharging pollutants into a navigable waterway without a permit).228
The basis of the claim was the fact that hazardous wastes disposed of into the
landfill were found to have leached into open bodies of navigable waters and
their tributaries. 229
The court determined that the defendant had violated the RCRA, but held
the defendant was not liable under the CWA, because any discharge of the pollutants was entirely in the past, precluding such liability under Gwaltney. 230 The
court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the continuing migration of the pollutants after discharge constituted a continuing discharge in itself.231
The court's fmding was adhered to upon reconsideration. 232 After the
Town of Brookhaven was found liable under the RCRA for contaminating waters
juxtaposed to the plaintiffs' properties, the court assessed the full cost of the
court-appointed expert to the town. 233 Defendant objected, claiming the court
erred in failing to determine whether the resident plai.ntiffs had the capacity to
pay a portion of the expert's costs.234 The court affirmed its order, finding the
court had the discretion to assess the costs in whatever manner the court believed
justified.m It was counter-intuitive to place financial obstacles in the path of
citizen litigation in the protection of the environment.236 As taxpayers of the
town, the residents helped finance the town's costs of litigation, including the
costs of experts.237 Finally, the court found that as working-class residents, im-

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
See id. at 104-05.
See id. at 104.
See id. at 120-21.
See id.
See Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 149 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
See id. at 13-14.
See id. at 14.
See id.
See id. at 15.
See id.
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posing additional costs of expert testimony would constitute hardship to the
plaintiffs. 238
In Pronso/ino v. Marcus, 239 plaintiffs, having applied for a timberharvesting permit, received the permit from the California Department of Forestry with many serious restrictions attached that were designed to reduce soil
erosion into the Garcia River. 240 The EPA designated the Garcia as a water body
that was in violation of its water quality standards due to nonpoint source pollution, and thus required the state to establish total maximum daily loads for the
Garcia. 241 The state missed its deadline to submit its own TMDLs, whereupon
the EPA imposed its own TMDLs on the state.242 The TMDLs established a total
maximum amount of sediment loading that equated to a sixty percent reduction
in sediment pollution from all combined sources, including nonpoint sources
such as timber harvesting. 243 The plaintiffs argued the permit restrictions were
directly caused by the EPA's TMDL standard, as the California Department of
Forestry would not issue any permit that could violate it, for fear of losing funding.244 The plaintiff then brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act,
challenging the EPA's interpretation that the Clean Water Act allows it to establish TMDLs on rivers polluted solely by nonpoint source pollution. 245
The court evaluated the statutory language of the CWA, and noted that
section 303, which requires the states to create EPA-approved water quality standards or to have the EPA impose standards upon them, did not draw any distinctions among navigable waters or their pollutants.246 The court instead found the
mandatory planning process of section 303, in order to insure the adequate implementation of water quality standards for all navigable waters, required the
EPA to address nonpoint as well as point sources in approving or determining
TMDLs. 247

238.
See id. at 16.
239.
Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
240.
See id. at 1338.
See id. at 1339-40.
241.
See id. at 1339.
242.
See id. at 1340.
243.
See id. at 1338-40.
244.
See id. at 1337.
245.
See id. at 1341-47.
246.
See id. at 1347. The district court's decision was upheld by a three-judge panel of
247.
the appeals court. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002). The court held that the
statutory language of§ 303(d), whereby states must identify and compile a list of all waters for
which certain "effluent limitations are not stringent enough" required the states to identify (I) waters as to which the effluent limitations applied, but water quality standards were not met and (2)
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Various federal agencies, including the EPA, Department of the Interior,
Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, and others, have agreed
upon a final comprehensive science-based approach to watershed delineation and
assessment on federal lands. 248 Factors affecting the watershed will be considered when determining the best management practices and priorities for both land
and water uses. 249 The agencies' watershed goals will involve minimizing adverse water quality impacts from management programs, minimizing the impairment of current and future uses, and restoring watersheds that do not reach
water quality standards. 250
In December 2000, Montana submitted a total maximum daily load plan
designed to relieve impairments to water quality caused by reduced flow in water
bodies by adjusting water withdrawal.2SI Although EPA officials commended the
plan, the EPA refused to set a precedent for approving solely flow-based
TMDLs, stating that the CWA only required TMDLs for situations resulting from
pollutants.252 The EPA went on to state that flow alterations are not included in
the CWA's defmition of a pollutant.m Montana officials stated that the state
would probably attempt to address water flow concerns on a voluntary basis with
water users, while focusing its resources on the actually required TMDLs. 254
The EPA has requested comments on its proposed draft for technical
guidance for managing agriculture nonpoint source pollution. 2ss The guidance
provides background information on the problem as well as information on upto-date reduction methods. 2S6 The comment period for the notice of a draft,
which offered technical guidance for managing nonpoint sources of water poilu-

waters as to which effiuent limitations do not apply and water quality standards are not met. See id.
at 1126. Upon this rationale, TMDL requirements were found to apply to the Garcia River. See id.
248.
See Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and Resource
Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 62,566, 62,566 (Oct. 18, 2000).
249.
See Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and Resource
Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at 62,569-62,570.
See Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and Resource
250.
Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at 62,569-62,570.
See Susan Bruninga, Plan Addressing Flow in Montana Creek Not Caused by
251.
TMDL Program, EPA Says, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1635 (Aug. 17, 2001).
See id.
252.
253.
See id.
254.
See id.
255.
See Notice of Availability of Guidance for Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollution
from Agriculture and Request for Comments, 65 Fed. Reg. 61,325,61,325 (Oct. 17, 2000).
256.
See Notice of Availability of Guidance for Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollution
From Agriculture and Request for Comments, 65 Fed. Reg. at 61,325.
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tion from agriculture, published on October 17, 2000, required that comments
sent by mail be postmarked no later than January 16, 2001.257
VI. CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS

In January 2001, the EPA announced a proposed rule that would change
the permitting requirements for confined animal feeding operations ("CAFOs").2ss The EPA asked for comment on two options for defining CAFOs under
NPDES permitting. 2s9 The frrst option would establish a two-tiered system, designating all facilities with greater than 500 animal units as CAFOs and granting
discretion to the permitting authority to determine whether smaller facilities are
CAFOs. 260 The other option would establish a three-tiered system, designating
all facilities with more than 1000 animal units as CAFOs, designating all facilities with 300-1000 animal units that meet certain other conditions as CAFOs, and
granting discretion to the permitting authority to determine that any facility is a
CAFO, no matter what the size.261 Under the proposed rule, the number of facilities classified as CAFOs and subject to permitting would increase to as many as
39,000 from the current level of 2,500.262 The proposed rule would also expand
permitting to include dry-manure poultry operations and stand-alone immature
swine and heifer operations. 263 EPA officials stated that the new regulations were
not intended to cover operations that used concentrated feeding practices during
the winter and stressed the need for public comment and input to cover situations

257.
See Notice of Availability of Guidance for Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollution
From Agriculture and Request for Comments, 65 Fed. Reg. at 61,325.
See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Efflu258.
ent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed.
Reg. 2960,2960 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122 and 412).
See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Efflu259.
ent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 2960.
260.
See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 2962.
See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Efflu261.
ent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 2962.
See Terrence J. Centner, EPA Announces Proposed Rule Changes for Animal Feed262.
ing Operations, 17 AGRIC. L. UPDATE 1,2 {Sept. 2000).
263.
See id. at 1; Scott Fancher, EPA Announces Proposed Rule Changes for Animal
Feeding Operations, 17 AGRIC. L. UPDATE 1 {Sept. 2000).

2002]

Developments Concerning Environmental Law and Agriculture

369

they had not thought of. 264 Environmentalists were critical of the proposal, in part
because the proposal did not address the possibility of phasing out lagoons to
store animal waste. 265 As with the TMDL proposal, the CAFO proposed rule
generated a firestorm of sharply divided comments. 266 Agricultural groups contended the proposed requirements for nonpoint pollution were not authorized by
the CWA, would be excessively costly, and challenged the co-permitting requirements designed to extend responsibility beyond contract growers to the corporations that own the livestock.267 State officials contended the rules would undermine functionally equivalent state programs. 268 Environmental groups, however, supported the proposal as a long overdue regulation ofCAFO's.269
Prior to issuing the proposed rules, the EPA approved a final project
agreement to allow egg producers to develop an environmental management system and to allow states to issue general CWA permits for these operations. 270 The
EPA viewed the project as a way to bring more of the operations into the regulatory regime more quickly, pending a change in the CAFO regime that would include "dry litter" operations. 271 Environmentalists were critical of the plan, saying that it would "reward some of the most egregious violators of the Clean Water Act. " 272
The EPA is also attempting to regulate contamination by atmospheric
deposition. 273 Mercury levels in fish in the Savannah River exceeded state con264.
See Tripp Waltz, Concentrated Winter Feeding not Covered by EPA Proposal on
Feedlot Runoff Control, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 605 (Mar. 20, 2001).
265.
See Susan Bruninga, EPA Proposal Could Require Thousands More Feedlots to Get
Permits 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 2659 (Dec. 22, 2000); see also Susan Bruninga, Draft
CAPO Proposal Would Require Co-Permitting, Revise Threshold Limits, 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No.
43, at 2316 (Nov. 3, 2000); Susan Bruninga, Most Feedlots Would Have to Apply for NDPES Permits Under EPA Guidance, 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1724 (Aug. 18, 2000) (discussing
various criticisms offered by several environmental organizations); Carolyn Whetzel, Proposal to
Curb Runoff From Feedlots an 'Administrative Nightmare,' Farmers Say, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA)
No. 11, at 495 (Mar. 16, 2001) (industrial criticism of the proposed regulation).
See Susan Bruninga, Legality, Strictness of Proposal to Tighten Rules on CAPOs
266.
Questioned in Comments, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1722 (Aug. 31, 2001).
267.
See id.
268.
See id. at 1723.
See id.
269.
270.
See Susan Bruninga, Environmental Group Vows Fight Over XL Project for Egg
Producers, 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 2325 (Nov. 3, 2000).
271.
See id. at 2326.
Jd.; see generally Thomas R. Head, III, Local Regulation of Animal Feeding Opera272.
tions: Concerns, Limits, and Options For Southeastern States, 6 ENVTL. LAW 503 (2000) (discussing local regulation ofCAFOs).
273.
See Susan Bruninga, EPA Authority to Set TMDL for Mercury From Air Deposition
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sumption guidelines, and the EPA's final TMDL included mercury, in an attempt
to lower those levels. 274 Comments on the final TMDL regulations contested the
EPA's jurisdiction to regulate pollution that comes from atmospheric deposition,
but the EPA backed up its assertion of jurisdiction by citing federal court decisions that affirmed the EPA's authority to regulate based solely on non-point
sources ofpollution. 27s
Vll. THETMDLPROGRAM
Established in the 1972 Clean Water Act, the TMDL program provides a
process for identifying waters that fail to satisfy state water quality standards,
calculating the total maximum daily loads of a pollutant that a water body can
assimilate while maintaining applicable water quality standards, and incorporating TMDLs into the state water quality planning process. 276 Recently, the TMDL
program has become one of the most debated environmental concepts in the
country, largely due to a revised set of regulations drafted in July 2000.277 Those
rules specifically provide that nonpoint sources of pollution such as agricultural
operations are to be included in the TMDL process. 278 They also establish a controversial timetable for states to develop TMDLs. 279

Contested in Comments, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 445 (Mar. 9, 2001).
274.
See id.
275.
See id.; Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1345; David K. Bowles, Case Summary:
Pronsolino v. Marcus EPA May Impose TMDLs for Substandard Rivers Impaired Solely By Nonpoint Sources, ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON AGRIC. MGMT. NEWSLETTER, June 2000, at 15; Susan
Bruninga, Court Rules TMDL Program Can Apply to River Polluted by Nonpoint Sources, 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 639 (Apr. 7, 2000).
276.
See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,590 (July 13,
2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 9).
See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi277.
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,586.
See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi278.
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,593.
See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi279.
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,590-43,591.
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With citizen suits and inconsistent court orders, the EPA convened a
committee in 1996 under the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA") to address the TMDL issue directly. 280 The FACA Committee was comprised of diverse groups including agricultural, industrial, and environmental interests. 281
While its members were able to achieve considerable agreement on a number of
important issues, the Committee split on the question of how the TMDL process
should be used to address nonpoint source pollution. 282 In March 2000, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") issued its first report highlighting a substantial
lack of data available to determine which water bodies were impaired and to set
appropriate TMDLs. 283 The GAO published a second report in June 2000, questioning the reasonableness of EPA's economic analysis of the proposed regulations.284
A final rule revising the TMDL program was issued in July 2000. 285
Nonpoint sources were included in the TMDL program, and states were required
to establish TMDL's by mid-2002. 286 The revisions were immediately challenged by several groups representing industries that are primarily point source
producers of pollution and agriculture groups concerned primarily about the
regulation ofnonpoint source pollutions.287
The EPA has proposed an eighteen month delay to the effective date of
the final rule issued on July 13, 2000, which revises the CWA's Total Maximum
Daily Load Rule. 288 If the EPA's proposal were accepted, the effective date of
280.
See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for the Clean Water Act's
Ambient Standards Program, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) I 0,415, 10,422 (Aug. 1998).
See id.
281.
282.
Seeid.
283.
See GAO, Water Quality, Key EPA and State Decisions Limited by Inconsistent and
Incomplete Data, GAOIRCED-00-54 (Mar. 2000).
284.
See GAO, Review of Two EPA Proposed Regulations Regarding Water Quality
Management, GAOIRCED-00-206R TMDL Regulations (June 2000).
285.
See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,586 (July 13,
2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 9).
286.
Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions
to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the
Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,588, 43,617.
See Susan Bruninga, Nine Petitions Filed in Major Fight Over Final Rule Revising
287.
TMDL Program, 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2618 (Dec. 15, 2000); see also Lisa E. Roberts,
Note, Is the Gun Loaded This Time? EPA's Proposed Revisions to the Total Maximum Daily Load
Program, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 635 (2000).
288.
See Delay of Effective Date of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Pro-
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the July 13, 2000 final rule would be extended from October 1, 2001 to April30,
2003. 289 The July 2000 final rule had a spending prohibition attached to it, which
will expire on September 30, 2001, and unless Congress or the EPA takes action,
the rule is scheduled to go into effect thirty days later on October 1, 2001.290 In
light of the numerous concerns expressed by organizations, pending litigation in
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals/91 and a Congressional mandated report entitled "Assessing the TMDL Approach to Water Quality Management," issued by
the National Research Council ("NRC") of the National Academy of Science,
which recommends the TMDL program be changed in certain respects,292 the
EPA believes that it would be prudent to extend the effective date, to allow time
for a reconsideration and re-proposal of certain aspects of the July 2000 rule. 293
Currently, the program continues to operate under the 1985 TMDL regulations,
which were amended in 1992.294 In addition, acting under further suggestion by
the NRC report, the EPA has proposed to extend the deadline for States to submit
their next list of impaired waters from April1, 2002 to October 1, 2002. 29s Written comments on this proposed rule were being accepted up until September 10,
2001.296 Comments on the proposed delay in implementation of the TMDL program were extensive and sharply divided. 297 Environmental groups opposed delay, but farm groups and industrial dischargers supported the delay. 298 Farm
groups in particular objected to the rule's regulation ofnonpoint source pollution
as beyond the EPA's authority, and required implementation plans as federal
presumption of local land-use policy.299 These groups also supported the delay

gram in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulations; and
Revision of the Date for State Submission of the 2002 List of Impaired Waters, 66 Fed. Reg.
41,817, 41,817 (Aug. 9, 2001)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, and 130) [hereinafter Delay of Effective Date].
289.
See Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. at 41819.
290.
See Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. at 41819.
291.
The Federal Water Quality Coalition filed one of about a dozen petitions for review
of the July 2000 rule. Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Whitman, No. 00-1320 (D.C. Cir. July 18, 2000).
292.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AsSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH TO WATER
QUALITY MANAGEMENT (2001), available at http://www.nap.edu.
293.
See Susan Bruninga, Environmental Advocates Oppose Delay in TMDL Rule; Industry, Ag Groups Supportive, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1828 (Sept. 21, 2001).
294.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNCIL, supra note 292, at 15.
295.
See Bruninga, supra note 290, at 1829.
296.
See id. at 1828.
297.
See id.
298.
See id.
299.
See id. at 1828-29.
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for states to submit their lists of impaired waters. 300 Since the close of the comment period, many environmental organizations have grown dissatisfied with the
rule currently under consideration, labeled the "Watershed Rule" by EPA officials, and have asked the agency "to scrap the rulemaking altogether," preferring
the EPA to concentrate on implementing the 1992 rule instead. 301 Environmental
organizations are afraid the new rule will not require the EPA to implement
TMDLs in states that fail to do so on their own.302 The centerpiece of the new
rule is a "continuous planning process" ("CPP") called for in § 303(e) of the
CWA. 303 The CPP basically consolidates into one plan all the CWA water quality requirements found in other sections. 304 The TMDL program would therefore
be integrated into the CPP. These CPPs would be developed by the states to address watershed problems, and would only be subject to review by the EPA once
every five years to determine if water quality objectives were being met. 305

Vill. WETLANDS REGULATION
In Branstad v. Veneman 306 plaintiff farmers repaired a tile drainage system on their farmland, with permission from the USDA. The USDA asserted its
approval only extended to the system on one area of the wetlands, rather than the
wetlands at issue. 307 The Branstads sued the USDA alleging the department erroneously converted protected wetlands to crop use and arbitrarily refused to consider the plaintiffs' administrative appeatl08 The court concluded the Branstads
made the requisite showing of irreparable harm because they could not be fully
compensated for the intangible value of the farming operation or the intangible
costs of their likely bankruptcy. 309 Reiterating the importance of the prevention

300.
See id. The EPA subsequently circulated a draft report on the total estimated costs
of the TMDL program which reported the costs to industry to implement the TMDL program could
range from under $1 billion to $4.3 billion annually. See EPA, The National Costs of the Total
Maximum Daily Load Program (Draft Report), EPA 841-D-01-003 (Aug. 2001).
Susan Bruninga, Water Quality Standards: Some Reform of Impaired Waters Pro301.
gram May Be Achieved in Guidance, Official Says, 33 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1808 (Aug.
16, 2002).
See id., at 1809.
302.
See id., at 1808-09.
303.
304.
See id.
305.
Seeid.
Branstad v. Veneman, 145 F. Supp. 2d lOll (N.D. Iowa 2001).
306.
See id. at 1014.
307.
See id. at 1014-1016.
308.
See id. at I 024.
309.
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of wetlands conversion, the court found the public policy interests of the
"Swarnpbuster" Act could not justify arbitrary agency action or the failure to
maintain the status quo while judicial review is undertaken. 310 The court granted
the Branstad's motion for preliminary injunction enjoining the USDA's enforcement actions against the Branstad's for conversion of wetlands and failure to
comply with a restoration agreement for that tract. 311
After the court granted the plaintiffs' request for an injunction, the defendant secretary moved for reconsideration.312 The secretary filed a motion under rule 60(b), the "exceptional circumstances" standard, of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.313 The court denied the motion, doubting that the secretary could
either satisfy the due diligence factor required for obtaining rule 60(b) relief, or
produce "newly discovered evidence" that would warrant a different result. 314
While the court found that the secretary had correctly and timely filed its
motion for relief from a judgment of an order under rule 60(b),m the court held
that the secretary had relied upon the wrong standard ("manifest error") instead
of the rule 60(b) standard of "adequate showing of exceptional circumstances,"
premised upon "newly discovered evidence. " 316 In order to prevail under rule
60(b), the movant must show "(1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) due
diligence was exercised to discover the evidence; (3) the evidence is material ...
and (4) the evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a different
result."317 The court doubted the USDA's efforts to expedite recovery of the evidence during the preliminary injunction hearing, but relied on the "more fundamental deficiencies" of the change in result prong. 318
The "newly discovered evidence" that the USDA cited in its appeal dealt
with the finding that the Branstads had mailed their appeal to the wrong address,
not that the National Appeals Division's (''NAD") office had lost the request. 319
The court did not fmd that this evidence would have changed the results of the
preliminary injunction, as it did not generate an inference that the wrong address
was the primary reason for the NAD's rejection of the request for considera310.
See id. at 1025.
311.
See id. at 1026.
312.
See Branstad v. Veneman, No. C01-3030-MWB, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10543
(N.D. Iowa July 19, 2001).
·
313.
See id. at *6.
314.
See id. at *14, *16.
315.
Seeid.at*10-*11.
316.
See id. at *11.
317.
/d.at*14.
318.
Seeid.at*15.
319.
Seeid.at*5.
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tion. 320 The court rejected the USDA's argument that the outcome would have
been changed because the failure to receive the request was based on the negligence of the Branstads in mailing the request to the wrong address and not the
fault of the agency. 321
Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought review of the USDA's decision that
they had violated the Swampbuster Act. 322 The court revised the agency's determinations that the plaintiffs administrative appeal had been rendered moot by
their entry into a wetlands restoration agreement. 323 The court held the director's
decision had been an abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to
law; as such, it could not stand.324
In Prokop v. USDA,m plaintiff farmer sought review of a USDA
determination classifying his property as farmed wetland pasture. 326 Plaintiff
informed the defendant of his intent to clean out a drainage canal on his farm to
protect his continued eligibility for farm program benefits. 327 Defendant
inspected the plaintiffs farm and classified two areas as farmed wetland pasture
under the "Swampbuster" Act. 328 Plaintiff exhausted his appeals of this
classification through all agency channels. 329 The court found that the record
supported the USDA's classification, and the plaintiff was disqualified from
federal farm program benefits. 330
Brace v. United Statesl 31 concerned plaintiffs purchase of two parcels of
land in 1975 from his father with the intent to carry on the family farming business.332 The government claimed, ''plaintiff purchased the property with the intent of integrating [it] into [a] larger 600 acre operation."333 Plaintiff claims he
cleared, leveled and drained the property, and began to grow crops on the site in
1976.334 Defendant asserts that the plaintiff did not begin to farm the land until

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

See id. at *24.
See id.
See Branstad v. Venernan, 212 F.Supp.2d 976,978 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
See Branstad, 212 F.Supp.2d at 1006-07.
See Branstad, 212 F.Supp.2d at 1006-07.
Prokop v. USDA, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (D. Neb. 2000).
See id. at 1302.
See id. at 1303.
See id.
See id. at 1304-05.
See id. at 1316.
Brace v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 272 (2000).
See id. at 274.

!d.
See id. at 275.
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1986.335 Plaintiff received three orders to refrain from further disturbing the area,
and in the summer of 1988, requested his property receive the status of "commenced conversion from wetlands" prior to December 23, 1985.336 The United
States filed an enforcement action against the plaintiff and subsequently the district court entered a Consent Decree enjoining the plaintiff from operating and
maintaining the drainage system. 337 "Plaintiff complied with the court decree by
eliminating the drainage system. "338 Plaintiff filed suit alleging that as a result, a
substantial portion of the property was unusable for his farming operation and
had been taken from him for public benefit without just compensation.339
Plaintiff claimed he could not have been aware that the federal jurisdiction and authority extended to his property under the Clean Water Act when he
purchased and began farming the land because jurisdiction had not been extended
until 1977.340 The court held that the plaintiff knew the character of the land was
wetlands at the time of purchase, knew "the soil and conservation plans were
prepared for his father, [and] knowingly took a risk that environmental regulations would become more stringent when he fail[ ed] to promptly apply for a section 404 permit." 341
In Borden Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,342 real estate developer Tsakopoulos brought an action challenging the
authority of the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA to regulate
deep ripping of wetlands. 343 The Corps filed a counterclaim seeking injunctive
relief and civil penalties for developer's alleged violations of the CWA. 344 Tsakopoulos purchased a ranch that had primarily been used for cattle grazing with
the intent to convert the ranch into a vineyard and orchards and subdivide into
smaller parcels for sale. 345 For the vineyards and orchards to grow, "deepripping" was required. 346 Tsakopolous was issued a retrospective permit to deep
rip part of the property, but not the area containing vernal pools, and with restric-

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
Cir. 2001).
343.

344.
345.
346.

See id. at 274.
See id. at 275.
See id.
!d.
See id.
See id. at 274, 276.
!d. at 284.
See Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 261 F.3d 810 (9th
Seeid.
See id. at 813.
See id. at 812.
Seeid.
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tions on the depth of the deep ripping in the areas containing swales.347 The
Corps subsequently discovered that deep ripping had occurred in protected wetlands and issued a cease and desist order.348 Tsakopolous continued to deep rip
without a pennit. 349 Tsakopolous claimed regulators were abusing their authority
by applying law to normal farming and ranching activities, which were exempt
from the CWA. 350 The appellate court concluded that normal plowing could be
regulated under the CWA if it significantly changed the flow of water into nearby
navigable waters.m Tsakopolous' conversion of ranch lands into vineyards and
orchards was found to be a change in the use of the land, radically altering the
regime of protected wetlands. 352 The court found the Corps and the EPA exercised proper authority and jurisdiction over the area.m
Plaintiff landowner appealed the final order in favor of the Army Corps
of Engineers.354 The court affrrmed defendants' jurisdiction over the land
owner's activities, reversed the findings of violations in the vernal pool because
it exceeded defendant's jurisdiction, affrrmed the finding of deep ripping in the
swales, and remanded the civil penalties for recalculation because of the reversal
of the vernal pool violation.m
On appeal, the government conceded the ruling in Solid Waste precludes
the Corps' authority over the vernal pool in dispute and withdrew its enforcement
claim with respect to the pooJ.356 The court accordingly reversed the district
court's findings ofCWA violations in the vernal pooJ.357
The court concluded that there was no merit in plaintiff landowner's
three challenges to the court's calculation of a civil penalty. 358 First, plaintiff
contended ''the penalty should have been based on the number of days in which
the illegal ripping occurred, not on the number of individual passes with the ripper."359 He argued "that the statutory language per day for each violation means
that he can only be assessed $25,000 for any day in which ripping violations oc-
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curred, regardless of the total number of rippings in that day." 360 The court dis·
agreed and held that the better rule is to treat each rip as a separate violation as it
is more in line with the statutory language, with prior judicial interpretations, and
with the general policy goal of discouraging pollution.361 Under plaintiff's reading, individuals would be encouraged to "stack all their violations into one 'Pollution Day,' in which innumerable offenses could occur, subject only to the
$25,000 maximum." 362 The court did, however, remand to the District Court for
a recalculation reducing the penalty because of the elimination of the vernal pool
findings. 363
The dissent argued that "return of soil in place after deep plowing is not a
'discharge of a pollutant,"' and therefore, not subject to section 404 of the Clean
Water Act. 364 If deep ripping was prohibited by the CWA, Congress should have
spoken specifically to that act, as returning soil is not equivalent with adding
pollutants as Congress described in the Act. 365 The dissent concluded that the
policy decision made by the majority should be made by Congress, that the
court's decision went beyond statutory interpretation and that Congress should
speak explicitly on this subject if it wishes to regulate such farming actions. 366
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this decision, to be argued in the fall
term of 2002.367
The Corps issued a new and modified section 404 Nationwide Permits
("NWP") to replace NWP 26 in March 2000. 368 The old NWP 26 allowed development on up to three acres without an individual section 404 permit.369 The new
program applies to activities of one half acre or less which do not occur in tidal
wetlands, provides additional protection for wetlands in 100-year floodplains,
and requires notice to the Corps if an activity will destroy more than one tenth of
an acre (as opposed to one third of an acre under the prior NWP program). 370
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In addition, the scope of agricultural activities allowed in wetland areas
has been expanded to include dredge and fill activities on up to one-half acre of
wetlands in order to improve agricultural production. 371 Before the modifications, NWP 40 had been limited to agricultural building construction.372 Therevisions also used the term "farm tract" rather than farm, allowing multiple NWP
40s to be issued for a single farming operation, as long as the operation is divided
into multiple farm tracts. 373 The revised regulation prohibits Regional Army
Corps Districts from placing more protective regional conditions on NWP 40
participants, but states are free to place more stringent state requirements on the
permits or to revoke NWP 40 certification completely. 374
The EPA issued a final rule as of August 16, 2000, to strengthen section
404 ofthe CWA, known as the Tulloch rule, 375 which regulates the re-depositing
of dredged materials into wetlands, including agricultural wetlands. 376 In response to the comments received on the proposed rule, the final rule incorporates
several modifications.m The language of the final rule has been revised to clarify that the burden of proof has not shifted to the regulated community, with respect to defining what constitutes regulable discharge. 378 Secondly, a defmition
of "incidental fallback" has been supplied in the regulatory language, and was
derived from past preamble discussion of the issue, and is consistent with relevant court decisions involving the term. 379 The fmal rule is expected to increase
the protection of the Nation's water resources, including wetlands, as well as
provide increased levels of predictability for the regulated community.380 The
final rule follows a case-by-case method of analysis to determine whether or not
the dredged materials or a regulable discharge resulted from a particular activity,
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thus providing the flexibility necessary to adequately address varying factpatterns.381
IX. CONCLUSION

Ironically, the firestorm of disagreements between environmental and agricultural interests has led to one point of agreement in the upcoming Congressional debates over farm bill legislation. Environmental advocates, municipal
organizations, and agricultural groups agree that Congress should provide more
funding for conservation programs for agriculture. The House Agriculture
Committee approved legislation that would provide approximately $16 billion
over ten years for soil, water and wildlife conservation programs, or about $1.2
billion annually for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program. 382 Nearly
half of that amount would go for the first time to livestock producers, including
CAFO's. 383 Municipal organizations also support the Working Lands Stewardship Act of 2001 with authorization for $6 billion to farmers, ranchers, and foresters to preserve open space, improve water quality, protect public health, and
create habitat for protected species. 384 Environmental groups support an even
more generous bill that would nearly triple the funding of agricultural conservation programs. 385 The critical difference in their support is that agriculture views
the fmancial subsidies as an alternative to regulation, while municipal and environmental groups view them as a supplement to broader regulation. Whichever
view prevails, it appears likely that the Conservation Reserve and Wetlands Reserve programs will be more generously funded, as will most agricultural conservation programs. Disagreement, once again, will be over how much of that funding should be available to livestock producers. In every sense, the upcoming
farm bill debates promise to be over "pork barrel politics."

381.
See Further Revisions of the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of Discharge of
Dredged Material; Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4554-55.
See Press Release, Representative Tom Osborne, Representative Tom Osborne
382.
Praises Passage of the Farm Security Act of 2001 (Oct. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.house.gov/appsllist/Press/ne03_ Osborne!PR200 1/005.html.
See U.S. House Committee on Agriculture, The Farm Security Act of 2001, avail383.
able at http://agricultue.house.gov/2646.sum.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2002).
See Susan Bruninga, Municipal Groups Support Legislation Increasing Funds for
384.
Conservation, 32 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1724 (Aug. 31, 2001 ).
385.
Seeid. at 1724.

